A Decision Method for the Intuitionistic Theory of successor  by Lopez-Escobar, E.G.K.
MATHEMATICS 
A DECISION METHOD FOR THE INTUITIONISTIC THEORY OF 
SUCCESSOR 
BY 
E. G. K. LOPEZ-ESCOBAR 
College Park, Maryland 1) 
(Communicated by Prof. A. HEYTING at the meeting of September 28, 1968) 
By the (elementary) intuitionistic theory of successor, TS, we under-
stand the theory obtained from the formal theory given in IM ([1]) p. 82 
by the following modifications: (1) omit from the list of formal symbols 
(page 69 in IM) the function symbols + and ·, (2) omit from the list 
of postulates the following: 8°, 18, 19, 20, 21 and (3) add the following 
as postulates: 8I:----, A :J (A :J B) and *100: a=a. 
Atomic formulas of the form: r'"···' =s or ----, r"'···' =s where r, s are 
either variables or the individual constant 0 will be called basic formulas 
(e.g. ----, O"'"'=a is basic formula while 0"'=0" is not). 
Theorem. To every formula A of TS we can effectively associate a 
formula A* of TS such that A* is a positive Boolean combination of basic 
formulas, A* has exactly the same free variables as A and t- TSA ""A*. 
Proof is by induction on the length of A. If A is an atomic formula 
then the result is immediate. (e.g. a"= b"" is equivalent in TS to b" =a 
which is a basic formula). Also if A1 and A2 are TS-equivalent to positive 
Boolean combinations of basic formulas, then clearly so are A1 & A2 and 
A1 v A2. For ----, and :J we must first prove the following: 
Lemma: If B is a quantifier-free formula of TS which is substitution 
instance of a classical tautology, then t- TsB. 
Proof of lemma. First, for a quantifier-free formula B, it may be 
shown by induction on the length of B that t- TsB v----, B. Using this 
result it can be shown, again by induction, that if B' is obtained from B 
by replacing occurrences of v by ----, (-,A-,) then t- TsB ""B'. Finally by 
results of Godel it is known that if B is a substitution instance of a 
tautology, then B' is provable in the intuitionistic propositional calculus 
(c.f. Theorem 60 in IM, page 495). Hence the lemma follows. 
Now suppose we have shown that A is TS-equivalent to a positive 
Boolean combination of basic formulas. Because the distributive laws are 
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intuitionistically valid we may assume that A is TS-equivalent to a con-
junction of disjunctions of basic formulas, say M W FiJ· Since the 
i<n i<m 
basic formulas are quantifier free we may apply the lemma to obtain that 
I-Ts----, M W FiJ,...., W M ----, Fii· Furthermore----, FiJiseithera basic 
i<n i<m i<n i<m 
formula or TS-equivalent to a basic formula (again by the lemma). Thus 
----,A is TS-equivalent to a positive Boolean combination of basic formulas. 
The situation A1 :J A2 is similarly treated. 
Since in the intuitionistic predicate calculus & transfers across 3 ( c.f. 
*91: A & 3xB(x) ,...., 3x(A & B(x)), page 162 in IM) the case of the ex-
istential quantifier is treated as in the corresponding classical theory, e.g. 
I-Ts 3b(a" =b & b' =c & c'" =d),...., a"' =c & c"' =d. 
Although in the intuitionistic predicate calculus v does not transfer across 
V (c.f. Theorem 58, page 487 in IM) it can still be shown that if x does 
not occur free in 0, ----, 0 :J [Vx(O v B(x)) :J VxB(x)], from which follows 
that 0 v----, 0 :J [Vx(O v B(x)) ,...., 0 v VxB(x)] is provable in the intu-
itionistic predicate calculus. Thus if F is a basic formula in which x does 
not occur free then I-Ts Vx(F v B(x)) ,...., F v VxB(x). Thus in order to 
complete the proof of the theorem it suffices to show how to find positive 
Boolean combinations of basic formulas which are TS-equivalent to 
formulas of the form Vx(Fo(x) v F 1(x) v ... Fn(x)) where each of the Fi(x) 
are basic formulas in which the variable x occurs. The latter, although 
laborious, is routine. 
Let TSc be like TS except that postulate 81 is replaced by 8°: ----, ----, A :J A 
(i.e. TSc is the classical theory of successor). Then a consequence of the 
theorem and its proof is the following 
Corollary. There is a (primitive) recursive function f such that if n 
is a (Godel) number of a proof in TSc of a sentence A then f(n) is a (Godel) 
number of a proof in TS of A. 
In other words the classical and intuitionistic (first-order) theory of 
successor are really and truly the same (unlike when + and · are permitted 
because then there are sentences provable in the classical system which 
are not provable in the intuitionistic system). 
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